You ought to look at the ULTRA files. Army commanders and above knew about 352 by could not or would not share it down the Chain of Command. They took the risk, hence the gloomy predictions of casualties. An intelligence failure?
As I wrote in the body of the blog, there were limitations on the information that could be obtained from Ultra. A radio intercept might well identify the ST Lo as the location of the HQ of 352nd Infantry Division. It would be unlikely to include the locations of its company and battery size sub-units. Knowing that a division’s worth of weaponry was somewhere north of St Lo would not help Allied planners to find targets in enough detail to strike them on D-Day.
You ought to look at the ULTRA files. Army commanders and above knew about 352 by could not or would not share it down the Chain of Command. They took the risk, hence the gloomy predictions of casualties. An intelligence failure?
As I wrote in the body of the blog, there were limitations on the information that could be obtained from Ultra. A radio intercept might well identify the ST Lo as the location of the HQ of 352nd Infantry Division. It would be unlikely to include the locations of its company and battery size sub-units. Knowing that a division’s worth of weaponry was somewhere north of St Lo would not help Allied planners to find targets in enough detail to strike them on D-Day.