Category Archives: Review

The Last German Victory: Operation Market Garden 1944

This looks like Aaron Bates’ masters thesis: the second chapter includes the word  “Historiography” in the title. He takes a different approach to Op Market Garden, looking at the doctrinal differences between the German and British forces and how this shaped the outcome of the battle. It excludes reference to American doctrine, It is an academic study rather than a direct historical narrative, so don’t read this if you don’t know anything about the battle. The foreword is by Australian academic David Stahl.

I have not seen this approach before. In a nut shell, the conditions of Op Market Garden played to German doctrinal strengths. The stress on individual initiative and aggression meant that the Germans recovered from surprise quickly. German emphasis on self contained infantry with high organic firepower gave them a tactical advantage. The airborne assault and supposed rapid follow up by ground forces denied the British the opportunity to employ the indirect firepower and careful; planning that gave success from El Alamein onwards. He argues that the operation should be seen as a German success rather than an Allied failure. The Germans pitted old men and recruits against the finest soldiers the Allies could muster. He has a good word for the otherwise disastrous attack by KG Grabner in depleting the limited ammunition of 2 Para at the bridge

He pulls no punches in copy that would raise the blood pressure of literate Paras in his description of the failures of 1st Airborne Division’s commanders and the rout of their soldiers.

There are flaws. His analysis of British doctrine is a little superficial. His bibliography does not include anything by Terry Copp or Marc Milner., or much by John Buckley. Nor does it include anyone who has written about artillery doctrine in WW2. No Bailey, Bidwell, Farndale, Pemberton or even Townend and Baldwin. There are some dubious statements about artillery. He ignores the decentralisation of British artillery between 1940 and 1942. Command of British artillery might be centralised at the highest level, but control was decentralised via the network of FOOs and BCs. The weapon of artillery is ammunition not the gun. The weakness of 1st Airborne’s artillery compared to an infantry division was not just fewer guns, but the absence of ammunition resupply by the RASC.

This may appear to be nit picking. However, given the importance firepower played in contemporary British doctrine, it would be reasonable to assume it had been  studied.

He looks in some detail at the development of German infantry doctrine in the 1920s from the first world war Stormtroops, but seems to treat British infantry doctrine of 1944 as if nothing had changed since 1918. This ignores the British debate in the 1920s from the Great War triggered by Liddell-Hart’s influential “Man in the Dark” paper. The expanding torrent tactic was leading the British in the same direction as the Germans even if ultimately rejected.   The author of the re written Infantry Training Vol 2 expunging Liddell-Hart’s ideas was Major B L Montgomery.

The lack of research on Montgomery is disappointing, given his role in the operation and a little unfair as the target of criticism.  Bates comments on Montgomery are largely clichés.  Hamilton’s detailed biography of Montgomery is not listed as a source. This might explain why he does not appear to be aware of Montgomery’s employment of airborne troops in Sicily in a smaller scale but equally risky venture.

It is stimulating reading even if you disagree with what he writes.

The maps are reprints from Robert Kershaw’s It never Snows in September and the Holt’s guide to the battle.
208 pages 20 b/w plates.

Book Review: James Colvin: Eighth Army versus Rommel, Tactics, Training and Operations in North Africa 1940-1942

James Colvin: Eighth Army versus Rommel, Tactics, Training and Operations in North Africa 1940-1942  Helion & Co Ltd 2020

This is James Colvin’s first book and is based on research undertaken for his MA.  It is an academic work in that it is sourced and draws on primary sources.  His academic tutor was Matthais Strohn, and this work displays rigour and insights informed by someone close to the British Army.

The book does what is says on the tin, and covers tactics training and operations.

However, its real strength is the clinical examination of the culture of the British and Indian Army  and how this hampered the commanders and staff of the Eighth Army in  developing effective tactics.

The author pieces together the thinking that led to the ineffective tactics and the influence of the Indian army approach to armoured warfare.  It is worth reading alone for the exposition of the thinking of Tom Corbett, Eric Dorman Smith and Francis Tuker and how this led to a battlefield of boxes.  Much of this is new analysis and adds a new dimension to any thinking about the desert war battles.

The author is related to two Gunner veterans of the campaign. One relative is the ill fated Beresford Peirse  quotes extensively from the papers of his relative Robin Dunn,, an HAC officer during the campaign.  However, the Gunners themselves  escape critical review without mention of  one question often asked.   Why didn’t the British Heavy Anti Aircraft guns in a similar way to the Germans 88?

The 261 page work is illustrated with relevant sketches and photographs.

It should be on the reading list of anyone interested in the war in North Africa 1940-1942 or in the wider British Army of that period.

Not particularly cheap, but affordable.  £29,95  RRP

Book Review Commando John Durnford Slater

Greenhill books have published a revised edition of Durnford Slater’s 1953 memoir Commando: Memoirs of a Fighting Commando in World War Two.  This edition includes a new foreword by Neil Barber.

In June 1940 Captain John Durnford Slater RA was adjutant of a training regiment. His CO wrote such a supportive letter that Durnford Slater was appointed commanding officer of the first Army Commando to be formed – No 3 Commando. His memoir covers the formation, training and actions of No 3 Commando, from Guernsey in 1940 through the Lofoten Islands, Vaagso, Dieppe and Sicily, and of his commando brigade in Italy. He tells his story of his own experiences as a D Day planner and deputy commander of the divisional sized commando force in North West Europe.

Commando is the first-hand account by one of the men who created the commando concept and led them in battle. Commandos have copied by armies and navies world-wide as commandos or rangers, the US knock off.  It is also a study in leadership and command by a great fighting commander. It also includes delightful elements of what can be described as unofficial history – those stories that get left out of more guardedly written works, because of the reputational risk. Durford Slater’s men played hard and there are some escapades that would hit the front pages of the tabloids . Durnford Slater’s willingness to share these tales with his readers may also account for why he retired as a substantive major.

Appointed on 28th June 1940  Durnford Slater was given a fortnight to recruit and form No 3 Commando. After pillaging Southern Command for officers, these were sent to recruit volunteers for their own troops.  By 5th July his unit was in existence with thirty-five officers and five hundred men. Their first operation took place ten days later.  He and his officers seem to have been left alone to develop raiding techniques and a training regime that has been copied world-wide. It is hard to see how a comparable capability could be developed without a multi-million consultancy engagement. In 1940 a buckshee captain went off with the authority of the Deputy CIGS. The British Army seems have been ambivalent about Commandos, allowing the Royal Marines to own the concept. Durnford Slater’s work provides some explanations about why they may have been resented.

This work has much to offer anyone studying leadership and command. Durnford Slater sought intelligence, initiative and a sense of humour in his officers, perhaps recognising that sense of humour is the seventh core value of the Army. Every officer joined his unit as a subaltern, and every soldier as a private. He turned down Simon Fraser, Lord Lovat who would not relinquish his captain’s rank.  His approach to paperwork and discipline will strike a chord with many readers.

One glorious aspect of the memoir are the tales from the margins of military history, The punch-ups with Irish navvies and Royal Marines, the plot to blow up the German embassy in Dublin, booze ups in enemy territory, and the staged visits for VIPs to patrol no man’s land in Normandy against a controlled enemy. It turns over a corner of the rug under which much history is swept.

I can’t remember reading Commando before. Its one I wish I had read much earlier.

The book has 211 pages, and thirty-six black and white photographs. There are seven clear sketch maps to illustrate Commando operations.

The 2020 edition has a RRP of £13.99, though you will not need to pay that to obtain it online, and the 1953 edition can be obtained for around £3.00

Book Review The Secret Capture: U-110 and the Enigma Story, Author Stephen Roskill

This is a well written account of the capture of  the German submarine  U-110 on May 1941. This was possibly one of the most important naval actions of the battle of the Atlantic, with far reaching results. Although U-110 sank on tow, its precious Enigma machine had been extracted and its secrets helped to inform British naval intelligence of German U Boat movements and route convoys to avoid them.

The book was originally written in 1959, to rebut the claims of Rear-Admiral Daniel V. Gallery USN that his capture of U -505 in June 1944 was unique. In the official history “The War At Sea.” Roskill had downplayed the capture of U Boats.  U110 merited only a single line with the statement that it had been sunk. The first third of the The Secret Capture tells the story of the other submarine captures of the Second World War.  The rest of the book is a fine account of convoy OB318, its encounters with U Boats and the capture of U110 by the 3rd Escort Group under Captain Addison Joe Baker-Creswell, to whom the book is dedicated. There could be no mention of Enigma, but there are references to books, codes and enough “secret material” to fill two crates.

It is a very readable account which covers the human story of the war at sea from the point of view of officers and men from the Royal Navy and merchant marine. Roskill went to some length to track down ex sailors and merchant seamen ten years after the events.  He is a good writer and spins a good dit.

The book has 167 pages, and sixteen black and white photographs. There are six charts and two diagrams to explain the movements and convoy formations.  These are clear and helpful.

This edition includes a new foreword by Baker-Crewsell’s son Charles, with more biographical information.   Professor Barry Gough has written a short new introduction that explains the context and importance of the recovery of the Enigma machine.

There are two reservations about the work.  The book doesn’t quite do what it says on the cover. I would have expected to have read more about the exploitation of the Enigma machine. The 2011 edition seems overpriced with at RRP of £16.99, though you will not need to pay that to obtain it online, and the 1959 edition can be obtained for £0.80

This is a good historic tale, told well.

Elstob – A One Man Show

Last Friday the OP visited a remarkable show at  the Lion and Unicorn Theatre in Gaisford Street London NW5.  It was a one man show by Jonathan Douglas, MBE a veteran actor and radio journalist, best known as  a radio host in Hong Kong.  This was a series of monologues exploring the last 24 hours of life of  Lieutenant Colonel Wilfreth Elstob VC, DSO MC who died, aged 29, in the heroic defence of Manchester Hill on 21st March 1918.   It was great to see a play written about a real soldier from the First World War who wasn’t a war poet.  Elstob himself  was an interesting man, whose character, motivation and deeds offers a different view of the men who fought and died in the Great War.

Why Elstob?   The 16th Manchesters were one of  dozens of battalions that faced the onslaught of the German kaiserschlacht,  the action for which “Journey’s End” is a  theatrical  prologue.  Elstob was one of ten men awarded the Victoria Cross for actions on the  21st March, and one of some four hundred and fifty recipients of that award on the western Front.

Standards presented to the City Pals 1914

‘Wilfreth Elstob joined the Manchester Regiment as a private soldier in 1914; ‘a burly former schoolmaster.’  He was quickly commission into the 16th battalion (1st City Pals) and a captain and acting company commander  on their successful assault on the first day of the Somme.  1st of July when the battalion stormed the German lines at Montauban.  In October 1916 he took comm and of the battalion. He commanded his battalion through the 1917 battles  at Arras and Passcendaele, and temporarily a whole brigade  Elstob was a gallant popular, efficient and effective commander.  His comrades cared enough about his posthumous reputation to collect the information and lobby for him to be awarded the Victoria Cross after the war ended.

Memorial to the 2nd and 16th Manchester dedicated in 1996

Richard Holmes singled out the action on Manchester Hill as the focus for the Kaiserschlacht  part of the 1918 episode of ‘The Western Front.’   Holmes used a couple of quotes from Elstob.  As the band turning back to camp after the battalion marched to Manchester Hill Elstob remarked. “Those are the only men  who will get out of this alive”; About the quarry. “Here is battalion HQ: Here we fight and here we die.”   Was this a fatalistic reflection of the mood of the time?   Were these sentences  evidence that Elstob was close to cracking?  After all, either of these phrases deserve a listing in the Army Rumour SErvice’s list of “Phrases you would rather not hear”

Officers of the 16th Manchester Regiment 1914 – Elstob was the last to survive.

Its a brave attempt to get inside the mind of a hero and charismativc leader.   Jonathan Douglas’  interpretation of Elstob’s mind is thought provoking.   Douglas had done a good job of researching the details of his subject’s service.  References to places such as Montauban and  Trones Wood reflect diligent research,  beyond the expectations of typical Camden Fringe goers.   The dialogue reflects the known comments about Elstob’s character.

Sure, Douglas is not Au fait with the details of military life. It was “stand to” rather than “reveille”  in the  trenches themselves and a singing competition is more plausible in camp than in the quarry.   However, the result is a characterization of a complex character, a far cry from the caricature  often portrayed.  This is more ambitious than another version of RC Sherrif’s Stanhope.

Douglas had gone well beyond the call of duty and made a reconnaissance of the quarry on Manchester Hill. He bypassed the metal gates to break in across the barbed wire and worked his way through the  tangled undergrowth to take a picture of the site where Elstob and his comrades may still lie.

I could not find a review or a website, but if anyone wants to contact Jonathan Douglas, the OP has contact details.

Anatomy of a Campaign: The British Fiasco in Norway, 1940 – John Kiszely

I cannot recommend too highly John Kiszely’s book: Anatomy of a Campaign: The British Fiasco in Norway, 1940.   This is a great book that anyone interested in modern strategy and military affairs will find interesting.  It also casts a contrasting light on the popular view of 1940 influenced by films about Dunkirk and Churchll.

On Tuesday, at RUSI, he received the Duke of Wellington Award for the best military history work of the year. This is a military history, but with a specific purpose.  The work was inspired by his time at the Higher Command and Staff College for a study of a campaign as a whole, and that the Norway Campaign which ended in a defeat might offer more lessons than a success. In his book he dissects the campaign from policy decisions in cabinet through to the events on the ground and on the waves.

It should be a valuable case study for anyone with an interest in business or political strategy. While written for the general reader, John Kiszely explores causality and the interplay between the personalities and institutional cultures of the organisations that took part.

For anyone with an interest in the events of 1940, it adds sharp critical insight to the state of Britain’s armed forces and leadership. This pulls no patriotic punches. The frank admission that companies of Guardsmen ran away must have been painful to document. The book is an essential sobering complement to the sometimes public smugness about 1940 Dunkirk and Churchill.

It is a cautionary tale about military intervention and compulsory reading for anyone advocating that something must be done about some international crisis.  It is well written without labouring points or underlining obvious lessons, there is much that is familiar from recent history.  A divided cabinet. Public opinion demanding action. Institutions barely fit for purpose. It is also an object lesson about the longer view.  The OP asked how much damage did the occupation of Norway do in the long term to the allied cause.  The answer was probably very little: indeed, the German naval losses may have saved Britain from the Germans attempting an invasion the same year.

Its published by Cambridge University Press £28.00

 

China’s War with Japan – Rana Mitter, winner of the Duke of Westminster Award

china_war_with_JapanYesterday Dr Rana Mitter gave the lecture after receiving the Duke of Westminster Prize for Military History at RUSI for his book “China’s war with Japan 1937-1945- the Struggle for Survival” . His is fascinating not only does it tell the story of what has been a neglected corner, but it is also has much to say about the background to current day geo-politicval issues in Asia.

Much has been written about various turning points in WW2,. Such as the British decision, under Churchill, to fight on in 1940. Just as important was the decision by the Chinese Nationalist government to continue fighting after much of their country had been over-run. Had the Chinese surrendered in 1940, there would have been no quagmire holding down Japanese troops which could have been used in South East Asia , against British India or the Soviet Union. It is humbling to realise that the London Blitz started over a year after the sustained Japanese bombing of the Chinese temporary capital at Chongqing, – or Chungking as it was then known in English. Nor that the date 4th May 1919 was the 20th anniversary of a key date in Chinese history, the massed demonstrations in favour of modernisation. Nor was I aware that the Chinese Nationalist government were influenced by the Beveridge report which set out the post war welfare state.

It was particularly interesting to hear about who modern China has acknowledged the story of the nationalist Chinese part in the Second World War. How books films and ceremonies now commemorate events which could never have been mentioned a few years ago. For example. The hundred thousand Chinese soldiers who fought in Burma received no pensions or acknowledgement, of which around eighty are still alive. This year a memorial is being erected to their memory. It is a whole new dimension to the term “Forgotten army”

The conclusion of the lecture and the talk concerned the implications of modern China embracing the history of the war  against Japan.    China was one of the big four allies.  It paid a heavy price to survive and win.    It did not obtain the same territorial advantages gained by the USA and USSR.  Nor was there the same accommodation with the defeated enemies.  There is a sense of unfinished business.