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19th Century, Gunners, Military History, Napoleonic Wars

The Rocket Brigade at Leipzig 1813 – The Decisive Psychological Weapon?

2 November 2013 admin Leave a comment

1rhaa — The Rocket Brigade at Leipzig – David Rowlands

The Battle of Leipzig 16-19 October 1813, was the largest battle of the nineteenth century, and fought between the Prussians, Russians, Austrians and Swedes and French under Napoleon. The only mention of that the Emperor Napoleon makes about the course of the battle Leipzig, is that his forces were heavily outnumbered, but the allied victory would not have been as decisive if the Saxon Army had not defected to the Allies in the middle of the battle.

The Rocket Brigade RHA (now O Battery (the Rocket Troop) RHA,) was the only British unit to take part in the battle of Leipzig. This experimental unit played a part out of all proportion to its size and numbers. It may have played a key role in the surrender of the Saxon troops that gave rise of Napoleon’s bitter comments.

The Rocket Brigade RHA were at the Battle of Leipzig almost by historic accident. They were an experimental unit tasked with conducting what might be regarded as an operational test of the Congreve rockets on land.

Asian armies were using rockets for military purpose since the thirteenth century. By the time the British East India Company was fighting wars against the Indian states in the late C18th, rocket technology had developed. By using metal, rather than paper, cases the range of military rockets was extended from c.500m to c. 2,500m.

Stores “For the Annoyance of the Enemy”

Rocket_warfare — Troops of the East India Company under attack by Mysore rocket artillery

The Armies of Mysore equipped with these caused problems for the British, including inflicting a defeat at Battle of Pollilur (1780). At the invitation of the Admiralty, “to develop stores for the annoyance of the enemy” Colonel Congreve at the Royal Arsenal at Woolwich developed a range of rockets, which are known by his name.

These included rocket projectiles in different sizes from 6 pdr to 48 pdr and a sophisticated range of natures including solid shot,. Shell, incendiary carcass, case shot (shrapnel) and even illuminating parachute flare. The advantage of a rocket is that it does not need a heavy ordnance to launch it, allowing for a much larger weight of projectile. Rockets had a psychological effect, particularly on animals or those unfamiliar with the weapon. The disadvantages were the inherent inaccuracy of the rockets. This could be overcome by launching them en masse, the solution adopted even in WW2. After the fall of Seringapatam, the British found 600 launchers, 700 serviceable rockets and 9,000 empty rockets.

“Handsomest Men of His Day”

The Royal Navy made use of rockets to bombard ships in harbour, at Boulogne and Copenhagen. The inherent inaccuracy of rockets resulted in the town set ablaze along with docks and ships, and scepticism about rockets within the army, including by Arthur Wellesley, in command of the army in the Peninsular. None the less, in September 1811 an experimental unit was established at Woolwich to test rockets for land use, formed of 30 gunners under the command of Captain Bogue RHA. Described as “one of the handsomest man of his day and a friend of the Prince Regent” (1) Bogue had served in the Corunna campaign with B battery RHA.

191 — Captain Richard Bogue RHA – “One of the handsomest men of the day”

By May 1813 the Ordnance board had decided that everything that could be discovered from exercises had been extracted and that a trial would be needed on active service. The experimental unit would be brought up to strength for service in the field as the Rocket Brigade RHA. The opportunity arose in the spring of 1813 after Napoleon’s invasion of Russia. By the time the Rocket Brigade had landed in Stalsund on the Baltic coast of Germany the sixth coalition against Napoleon included Britain, Austria, Russia, Prussia and Sweden. The Rocket Brigade would join the Army of the North under the Crown Prince of Sweden.

Rocket Brigade RHA Movements before Leipzig 1813

The Battle of Görde 18 September 1813

The Rocket Brigade’s first action was on the 18th September 1813 at the battle of Görde North West of Danenberg in what is now Lower Saxony. Half of the brigade took part in the battle in which an allied force of Hannoverian, Prussian and Russian troops destroyed a French division advancing South from Hamburg. After the battle they rejoined the other half of the Brigade with the Army of the North at the siege of Wittenberg. Their guide across Germany was an officer of the 5th Battalion the Kings German Legion, who became the only member of the KGL to be present at the Battle of Leipzig.

The Battle of Leipzig 1813

The Rocket Brigade was attached to the Swedish Guard. It had a privileged position as a unit of the Swedish Army’s British paymasters. On the 18th October 1813, the third day of the battle of Leipzig, the army of the North approached the Battlefield from the North East. A British senior officer, General Sir Charles Stewart, was present at the battle. In a letter to Captain Bogue’s Father in law, Stewart’s ADC, Lieutenant John James wrote:-

“at the commencement of the action on the morning of the 18^th, Captain Bogue addressed himself to General Winzingtrode, commanding the advance of the Crown Prince, expressing his desire to see the enemy and requesting permission to engage. The General much taken with the gallantry and spirit of the address, granted as a guard a squadron of dragoons and requested Captain Bogue to follow his own plans and judgement.

Captain Bogue lost no time in advancing to the village of Paunsdorf, then in possession of five of the enemy’s battalion, upon whom he opened, in advance of the whole army, a most destructive fire. This was returned by musketry and for a time a very hot combat ensued, which the enemy , unable to withstand the very well directed fire of Captain Bogue’s brigade fell into confusion and began to retreat. Captain Bogue, seizing the moment, charged at the head of the squadron of cavalry, and the enemy terrified of his approach, turned around and taking off their caps gave three huzzas and , every man to the number of between two and three thousand, surrendered to the Rocket Brigade, which I believe did not exceed 200 men.

The intelligence of this success being communicated to the Crown Prince, he sent his thanks to Captain Bogue for such eminent services, requesting at the same time that he would continue his exertions: and the brigade proceeded in consequence to the attack of (I believe) the village of Sommerfeld (2) , still further in advance. Sir C Stewart accompanied the brigade and I was of the party. The situation taken up on the flank of the village was exposed to a most heavy fire , both of cannon balls and grapeshot from the enemy’s line, and from the riflemen in the village. A ball from the latter soon deprived us of the exertions of poor Bogue;it entered below the eye and passing through the head caused instantaneous death.” (3)

Karl_XIV_Johan,_king_of_Sweden_and_Norway,_painted_by_Fredric_Westin — Carl Jean Crown Prince of Sweden – sometime Jean Baptiste Bernadotte Marchal of France Prince of Ponte-Corvo

“Some Prussian battalions of General Biilow’s corps were warmly engaged at Paunsdorf, and the enemy were retiring from it, when the Prince Royal directed the rocket brigade, under Captain Bogue, to form on the left of a Russian battery, and open upon the retiring columns. Congreve’s formidable weapon had scarcely accomplished the object of paralysing a solid square of infantry, which, after our tire, delivered themselves up, as if panic struck, when that estimable man and gallant officer, Captain Bogue, of the British royal artillery, received a mortal wound in the head, which at once deprived society of a noble character, and this country of his valuable services. Lieutenant Strangways who succeeded in the command of the brigade, received the Prince Royal’s thanks, conveyed through me, for the important assistance they had rendered. I felt great satisfaction at witnessing, during this day, a species of improved warfare, the effects of which were truly astonishing; and produced an impression upon the enemy of something supernatural.(4)

Diabolical Things

Not everyone saw Congreve’s formidable weapon as an unmitigated improvement in warfare. Dr Wenzel Krimer, was a surgeon in a Prussian Reserve Infantry Regiment, commented.

“It was at this juncture that I realised the terrible effects of the Congreve rockets. I was not alone in asking myself in horror and disgust: Haven’t we enough instruments of death without needing to resort to these diabolical things, worthy of the inventiveness of an Adramelach (5) We were standing on a flat plateau and could overlook a large part of the enemy forces. In front of us was just such a devilish rocket battery. Each time a rocket was fired and went hissing and shooting forth fire into an enemy column and exploded, one saw whole files hurled down. The scorched and battered bodies lay in great piles where they fell. At first the French did not seem familiar with this new weapon of death and stood up against it; but when they saw what fearful destruction it wrought and in what a ghastly manner the victims died, even if only a drop of the fuel came too near, there was no holding them. Whenever they saw a rocket coming, whole columns ran away and abandoned everything. (6)

The Terrible Effects of the Congreve Rockets.

Colonel Hermann von Boyen was Chief of Staff for General von Bulow’s III Corps, the lead troops of the Army of the North. He described how, as soon as the Army of the North came into the battle line, a heavy artillery-duel began.

“About an hour later the French advanced from the so—called peasants’ houses with a column made up of two or three battalions and appeared to be heading for the Swedish corps which stood some distance back. In support was the English rocket battery under Captain Bogue. This gallant soldier immediately went forward undaunted with his battery against the enemy column and came so close that before he could open fire an enemy sharpshooter shot him dead. However, his subordinates were not dismayed by this loss, and the rockets produced a most unusual effect near where they were ignited. The French column, which hitherto had been advancing in very good order, even if latterly with a shorter step, was utterly dispersed just as occurs when one breaks up an ant heap with a blow, and it ran in total disorder back towards the peasants’ houses, amid our almost universal laughter.

When we marched next day across the scene of the French advance, we convinced ourselves of the important effects of the rockets. A considerable number of corpses lay there, but in addition several of them were completely burnt on their faces and uniforms in a most uncommon way, so that one could readily understand how the enemy’s morale had been shaken by this extraordinary operation.” (7)

What happened at Paunsdorf on 18th October 1813?

The action around Paunsdorf was one of the climactic episodes of the battle of Leipzig. The village was defended by the French VIIth Corps under the command of General Reynier of on the junction of the attacks by the Army of Poland by General Bennigsen and the Army of the North. It is also notable for the defection of the Saxon Army, which in his memoirs Napoleon claims that the allied success “would have been less decisive had it not been for the defection of the Saxons. In the midst of the battle, these troops having moved towards the enemy, as if intending to make an attack, turned suddenly around, and opened a heavy fire of artillery and musketry on the columns by the aids of which they had a few moments before been fighting.”(8)

The French troops opposing the Rocket Brigade in the afternoon of 18^th October were from General Reynier’s VII^th Army Corps. These comprised two divisions, and C 30 cannons. The 24^th (Saxon) Division commanded by General zon Zeschau, comprised of two brigades. One under Colonel v Brause, of five Battalions and a second under General von Ryssel, of three battalions, and the 32^nd (French) Division under General Durutte, of six battalions organised into two brigades. The Saxon division has been estimated at a maximum of 4,200 men with no more in Durutte’s division.

Pausendorf Tactical Map — ***Sketch of the Fighting around Paunsdorf 18th Oct 1813.*** . The Brigade of von Brause was deployed on the Taucha Road West of the village. The two battalion brigade of von Ryssel was deployed near Stuntz while the artillery was between Stuntz and Paunsdorf. The bulk of the 32nd French Diviison under Durutte was in the Chonefield- Sellershausen area. During the morning Paunsdorf was attacked by the 2nd Austrian Advance Guard Division from the East.(1) Any Austrian gains were repulsed with a counter-attack. Sometime early afternoon 14.00(?) Prussian Troops of the III Corps under von Bulow attacked Paunsdorf, from the North.(2) This attack too was initally unsuccessful. Captain Bouge deployed the Rocket Brigade, with its escort of Russian Cavalry in advance of other allied troops aginst Paunsdorf. (3) The defenders of Paunsdorf with draw, and after a pursuit by Bogue and his escort,2,000-3,000 surrender. Bogue is ordered to repeat his actions against Sellerhausen, and is killed by a ball fired from the village. The Rocker Brigade continuies to engage the French and may break up a cpounter attack. (5) v Ryssel’s Brigade and the Saxon Artillery defect to the advancing Russians of Bennigsen’s Army (6)

The Royal Saxon Army, were from the part of Germany where much of the 1813 campaign had been fought, and now overrun by Napoleon’s enemies. The Saxon officers had formed the opinion that the campaign was lost and the best course of action would be to defect to the allies. The French had already become distrustful of their Saxon allies. The 24th (Saxon) Division under General Von Zeschau had been ordered to march to Torgau, NE of Leipzig. The arrival of Austrian and Russian troops of the Army of Silesia and the Army of the North had blocked that move. As a consequence the Saxons deployed around Paunsdorf, which had been garrisoned by a battalion of French soldiers from Durutte;s 32nd French Division and two companies of Saxons on the Morning of 18^{th .} Von Brause’ Brigade of five battalions was deployed across the road to Taucha West of Paunsdorf, and von Ryssel’s Brigade of two battalions and a jaeger company near the Windmill at Stuntz. Three batteries of artillery were deployed between Stuntz and Paunsdorf. Five out of six of the six battalions forming Durutte’s French 32^nd Division were deployed formed in the area around Sellerhausen.

During the morning the Austrian Army 2^nd Advance Guard Division made repeated attacks on Paunsdorf. With support troops from Durutte’s division the French hung on to a position in the village or close to it until around 2 pm. The fire from the French Saxon artillery seems to have been effective in suppressing the Austrian artillery, killing or wounding artillery detachments and horses. This changes with the arrival of the Prussian troops from the army of the North attacking from the NE and the Rocker Brigade.

There seem to have been three stages in the Rocket Brigade’s actions.

First, acting on his own initiative Bogue deployed rockets against the “five Battalions of the enemy defending Paunsdorf”. This, in conjunction with an attack by infantry resulted in the defenders fleeing.

Second. Bogue followed up the withdrawal with a charge at the head of the (Russian?) cavalry squadron detailed to escort him by General Wintzingtrode. After this charge, according to Jones the enemy “ turned around and taking off their caps gave three huzzas and , every man to the number of between two and three thousand, surrendered to the Rocket Brigade.”

Third, on the orders of the Crown Prince of Sweden, the Rocket Brigade engaged troops near Sellerhausen. Here the battery comes under fire, Bogue killed, and the battery continues to engage the French under the command of Lt Strangeways.

What part did the Rocket Brigade play in the defection of the Saxon Army? At some point in this area, during the Rocket Brigade action the majority of the Saxon Army defected to the allies. Digby Smith includes a lengthy account sympathetic to the Saxons, apparently based on accounts by someone with von Ryssel. The Saxons were keen to avoid abandoning their artillery and artillerymen to French retribution. They also preferred to surrender to the Austrians, Russians or Swedes than to the Prussian who they saw as keen rivals. This account describes the defecting Saxons marching East from Stultz, out of contact.

That might explain the defection of von Ryssel’s Brigade. But how did von Brause’s Brigade, committed to the defence of Paunsdorf disengage and defect? Were these the troops that James wrote of as greeting their mounted pursuers with three Huzzas? Perhaps this was an announcement of a defection rather than the surrender of a mob. Otherwise why would an infantry unit organised enough to organise three cheers find more security in a square bristling with bayonets? The five battalions of this formation might add up to the 2,000-3,000 prisoners mentioned by James.

Did the presence of the Rockets give the Saxons an opportunity to defect? The British Joint Operational Research from WW2 found that German prisoners of War reported that rocket projectiles fired from aircraft was one of the more terrifying experiences. Despite Saxon disillusionment with Napoleon’s cause, Von Brause’s men seem to have fought determinedly at Paunsdorf – until under fire from the Rocket Brigade.

Aftermath of the Battle

Monument to Bogue In Taucha Cemetery — Monument to Captain Bogue In Taucha

The Rocket Brigade started with a strength of 142 officers and men, over 100 horses horses, four women and two children. During the battle of Leipzig the Brigade’s casualties were one officer and one man killed, six wounded and 26 horses killed and wounded. The Rocket Brigade was not involved in the Battle on the 19^th of October, but spend the day buring their dead. Richard Bogue was buried in Taucha churchyard, four miles away from where he fell, and a stone monument was erected over his grave in 1815 by national subscription. As the nineteenth century drew to a close the grave was found to have fallen into a state of neglect, but on this fact being made known members of the Bogue family and officers of the Royal Regiment of Artillery contributed money for its restoration.

First medals for Gallantry Issued to British Soldiers

In January 1814 the Crown Prince of Sweden sent the Swedish Military Order of the Sword, 4th Class (Knight) to Captain Bogue’s widow, and also a gift of 10,000 dollars. Six years later, he, as the King of Sweden awarded silver medals of the same Order to Sergeants Michael Taylor and Robert Chalkley, Corporals Edward Marks and William Wareham, and Bombardier John Guy. The reverse of each medal bore the inscription ‘FÖR TAPPERHET I FÄLT (‘For bravery in the field’). These medals were the first medals for bravery issued to British Soldiers.

The Rocket brigade was also given the battle Honour “Liepzig” and adopted as a battery Honour Title after the Royal Artillery adopted “Ubique” (Everywhere) in place of individual Battle Honours.

A descendant of Captain Bogue, happened to read the piece in the Daily Telegraph about the talk on Leipzig for the Battlefields Trust. Bogue’s descendant also called Richard, has in his possession Captain Bogue’s papers, including his Journal, and the letters sent to Bogue’s widow by the Prussian General Prince Blucher, and The Swedish Crown Prince Carl Jean. He also inherited Bogue’s nine volume travelling works of Shakespeare that accompanied him on campaign.

This and Bogue’s journal gives an insight into the character of a highly professional officer, whose decisions made a difference. He was also a cultured man, commenting in his journal on the tomb of Thomas a Becket and Saxon church architecture. 170 years after Liepzig an Ex Battery Commander of the Rocket Troop exorted the officers of his regiment to have professionalism, polish and panache. Richard Bogue RHA epitomised these qualities.

(This is the first of two posts based on the research for the talk given on behalf of the Battlefields Trust at the Fusiliers Museum at HM Tower of London on 15th October 2013. The Second part will cover the story of the Rocket Troop that fought at Waterloo, and ask why it is missing from many accounts of the battle) .

Notes

R
In fact the village was Sellerhausen
Letter from Lieutenant John James held by Mr R Drake copies in Firepower and O Battery.
Londonderry, Lieutenent-General Charles William Vane Marquess (Sir Charles Stewart) Narrative of the war in Germany and France in 1813 and 1814 (London 1830)
Boyen, Generalfeldmarschall, Herman von Denkwürdigkeiten und Erinnerungen, 1771-1813, 2 vols (Stuttgart 1899)
Adramelach was an Assyrian god to whom children were sacrificed on a fire.
Krimer, Wenzel Erinnerunger eines altern Lützower Jägers, 1795-1819, 2 vols stuttgart 1913 (in Brett James, Anthiony Europe against Napoleon
Bourrienne, Louis Antoine Fauvelet de, “Memoirs of Napoleon Bonaparte”

Battlefield Guiding, British Battlefields, Military History

Can History and Historic Fantasy co-exist? A new Magazine and Event are trying to bridge the Genres

19 September 2013 admin Leave a comment

To what extent does history and historic fantasy mix? How close to historic fact do we need to be to celebrate history and heritage? The launch of Seaxe magazine and the Fayre Times Festival are a bold attempt to reach people interested in both historic fact and the fantasy.

King Arthur - Cultural icon or medieval fantasy? — King Arthur – Cultural icon or medieval fantasy?

There is an obvious relationship between fiction and fact. Horatio Hornblower, Richard Sharp and Commando magazine are fiction and their activities, however accurately set contain fantastic elements of some kind The history of the Wars of the Roses offers an ill defined historic basis for historic fiction, such as the White Queen, but is also the basis for Hollywood films such as the Prisoner of Zenda and Game of thrones. The historic dark ages provides the culture and mythology that sustains middle earth as the best loved fantasy of modern times.

There are far more people who read Tolkein than Beowulf, and more viewers of the White Queen and Game of Thrones than visitors to Barnet Towton and Bosworth. So what attitude should those of us interested in military heritage take to people more interested in the culture and ethos inspired by history than in history itself? We have become used to re-enactors who portray people with an anonymous historic background. But there are also people who dress up as members of mythical societies based on medieval societies,mainly as a spin off from role playing games. Where do they fit into the heritage world?

426px-The_Battle_of_Dorking_(1871) — The fictional Battle of Dorking can make for an entertaining battlefield walk

There is a difference between history and heritage. The archaeological remains of Stonehenge is a fact. The ley lines of druid mythology may or may not have any historic basis, but do exist as part of our cultural heritage. This does not mean, and should not mean that a spot of mythical significance should have the same protection as, say, a battlefield. The Battlefields Trust is only concerned with the heritage of battlefields and not fictional battlefields such as the George Chesney’s Battle of Dorking or HG Wells fight against the martians on Horsfell common in Woking. However, it is right to encourage those fascinated by the myth to understand and support the protection of the historic heritage on which their myth is based.

Monument to a Fantasy Battle. The Martian Tripod in Woking. The role HG Wells' story in inspiring the invention of the Tank was recognized after WW1. — Monument to a Fantasy Battle.that influenced a real World War. The Martian Tripod in Woking. The role HG Wells’ story in inspiring the invention of the Tank was recognized after WW1.

Lots of subjects we now regard as mainstream and acceptable were once seen as deemed nerdish and derisory. In the 1960s and 70s military history was seen as an academic irrelevance. It took people such as Richard Holmes to make military history a respectable subject worthy of media interest. The late Don Featherstone and Paddy Griffith showed that it was possible to be a wargamer and have something serious to say about military history.

The Battlefields Trust is providing Seaxe with articles from back issues of Battlefield and will be represented at the Fayre Times Festival. The individuals behind the projects deserve support in helping to ensure that the message about the value of preserving interpreting and understanding battlefield heritage is not forgotten by those who draw on it for inspiration.

Gunners, Military History, Second World War

70th Anniversary of the Second Front – Italy 3rd September 1943

5 September 2013 admin 1 Comment

Canadian Troops about to open the Second Front in Calabria

The 3rd September was the 70th Anniversary of Operation Baytown, the landings by the 8th Army on the toe of Italy. It was largely unremarked in the press, even in Britain.

Operation Baytown was the first landing in force by the western allies on the mainland of Europe. The landing was largely unopposed and the Germans withdrew leaving blown bridges and felled trees. It has been overshadowed by the Anglo American landings at Salerno on the 9th September which faced a week long battle before the Germans withdrew – as the 8th army drew close.

The Italian campaign lasted for twice as long as operation Overlord, the allied invasion of North West Europe, which overshadowed it. The campaign cost the Allies around one third of a million casualties and the Germans over half a million, as well as an estimated 150,000 Italian lives. The campaign included several controversial episodes, with the battles to prise the Germans out of their positions in the winter of 1943-44 giving rise to the battles for Monte Cassino and the destruction of the abbey and to the landing at Anzio. The conditions around Monte Cassino were compared by several participants as reminiscent of the Western Front battlefields of the First World War. Many commentators have been critical of Allied generalship in the campaign, with US General Mark Clark and British General Harold Alexander singled out.

The value or otherwise of the actions and sacrifices of those who fought in the Italian campaign has been coloured by the counter factual debate about whether Italy should have been invaded at all. From their entry into the war in December 1941, the US Army Chief of Staff Marshal had been pressing for an allied cross channel assault at the earliest possible opportunity and resisted British calls for activity in the Mediterranean.

This determination of the US Army to try to open a second front in Europe ASAP may have been influenced by several factors. 1) Europe was the only place that the huge 100 division US Army could be deployed. 2) If the Army did not put up a convincing argument that it would use the resources in a sensible time frame, the priorities would be switched to the US Navy or USAAF. It was politically unacceptable to argue “Germany first” while doing nothing for two to three years. 3) This was a coalition and the Red army, in 1941-43 looked as if it needed urgent help to defeat the Germans. The US army expected setbacks and to take losses and were prepared for initial failures. Their historic tradition and models were based on the US Civil War and “Bull Run” “Fredericksburg ” and Chancellorsville were part of a learning experience that led to Appomattox via Gettysburg and the Wilderness. The US had not been a major participant in WW1 and military planning could be quite callous by Western European standards.

Lets return to the C word. The US were part of a coalition, with the British as partners. The British were horrified at the risks the Americans proposed to run in 1942 and 43. (Brooke, who liked and admired Marshall, wrote of interrogating Marshal about what he wanted to do with a ten division landing in Northern France in 1942. What direction did he want to exploit? etc.) Brooke did not appear to grasp the scale and simplicity of the US plan: Mobilise and deploy 100 divisions to France where they can fight the Germans – France because that’s the only space big enough in Western Europe. If the first ten divisions were defeated there was another 90 and the resources of America mobilised for a crusade. This wasn’t an approach the British could afford to take. The British had already been kicked out of Europe on three occasions (France Norway and Greece), and were at the limits of their resources. To the British; the American plans all seemed to ask the British to deploy their last army in Europe on a series of risky ventures where the initial casualties would be disproportionately British.

Coalitions need to find plans which satisfy their partners or they fall apart. The compromise achieved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff of two democratic governments was remarkably effective. The solution adopted was very successful, and worked out far better than the US planners might have expected. There was simply no prospect of a successful D day until the U Boats had been driven from the Channel, which was not until May 1943. It is hard to see a 1942 D Day as anything other than a bigger version of Dieppe, which is also the likely fate of a 1943 battle for Normandy mounted with the troops available in Europe in July 1943 and Italy still in the war.

The historic development of the war worked out far better. The North African campaign allowed the US Army to be blooded where the geography and resourced favoured the allies. The setback at Kasserine pass was not fatal. The US could deploy and test a First IX (Eisenhower, Patton, Bradley, Truscott, etc) with manageable numbers of troops. The rest of the Tunisian campaign allowed the US Army the time to learn and apply lessons. A similar set back on the French coastline might have ended up with the entire army in the bag. The invasion of Sicily allowed the allies to try out the techniques they would need for Overlord, against a modest outnumbered enemy. Op Husky was a huge strategic success. It was cited by Hitler as his reason for abandoning his 1943 offensive in Russia (Op Ziterdelle) at a point where some commentators have argued that his forces were on the brink of victory.

The Italian campaign was a second front on the mainland of Europe. The invasion of Italy took Italy out of the War and opened a second front which absorbed a German Army Group of 20+ divisions and forced the Germans to deploy a further 20+ divisions in SE Europe to to take on the occupation activities undertaken by the Italian army. The Italian campaign was fought in a geographically remote peninsular, which enabled the allies to deploy a single Army Group of 20 Divisions into Europe without the Germans being able to mass the resources to throw the allies into the sea.

British troops approach Austria May 1945

The troops involved in the Italian “side show” disproportionately damaged the Germans more than the Allies. The key battle for Op Overlord was to secure a lodgment area where the remainder of the US Army could be deployed direct from the USA – the Normandy campaign. The balance of forces available in the Normandy campaign was the result of a race to build up forces between the Allies using sea and air and the Germans, by road and rail. The Allies had a lot more troops , but could only limited shipping. The Germans had fewer troops in total, but it was easier for them to be concentrated. The allies won the battle for the build up and after an attritional battle lasting seven weeks the Germans ran out of troops to plug gaps and the Allies broke out. The 20+ divisions German troops in Italy and the casualties incurred throughout the campaign were not available on D Day in France to fight the crucial battle. Even if the troops of the 15 AG not been deployed in Italy, they could not have been used at the lodgement phase of Op overlord, because the number of troops was limited by shipping capacity. Even at the end of the Normandy campaign there were many US Divisions forces still waiting to be deployed. (E.g. (99th 100th & 106th ID 9th, 10th & 11th AD). If there had been no Italian campaign there would just be more US troops waiting to be shipped.

There is a parallel with the US Civil War. Arguably the war was won in the West, with the Confederate states split and dismembered by larger Union forces. The Eastern campaign, (and various incursions along the coast) however inconclusive, tied down CSA troops that might otherwise have made a difference on the West. Given that the Union had the preponderance of forces, it made sense to deploy on as many fronts as the CSA could be forced to deploy their smaller resources.

Instead of looking at the Italian campaign as a side show, it might be more constructive to consider it as a successful diversion, which succeeded in tying down Germans which might have made a difference elsewhere. it did not matter to the allies for this purpose exactly where they were fighting the Germans in Italy. Sure the air force wanted bases near Foggia, but whether the battle was North or South of Rome only really mattered to Mark Clark – and the Italians themselves. Whatever faults there might have been in the execution of allied operations around Monte Cassino, the overall aim was achieved. On D Day there were hundreds of thousands of German combat troops in Italy and even some en route from France. The battles around Monte Cassino played their part in defeating the Nazis and liberate Europe.

I think this might be a better way to remember the remember the sacrifices of the soldiers who fought and died in the Italian Campaign.

Military History, Normandy, Second World War

Roy Suzuki and the British Nisei

1 August 2013 admin 1 Comment

The story of the Nisei Japanese Americans in the Second World War is quite well known. The USA had a sizeable Japanese minority, whose treatment after Pearl Harbour remains controversial. This community produced a Japanese American units which served with distinction in Italy and France. While Britain had a less diverse population in the 1940s than in the C21st, Britain was home to people from around the world, including immigrants from the Axis powers and their descendants.

My interest in LCpl Suzuki started when a fellow member of the Kentish Town Sports Centre, asked me why someone with a Japanese name might be in the British War Cemetery in Normandy. He wasn’t sure whether this was a British, Canadian or even American cemetery

But he was right. There are two men named Suziki on www.cwgc.org The first is Donkeyman K Suzuki, born in Japan, who died on 1st March 1917, aged 34, when the SS Munificant was sunk without warning 3 miles NNW of Cap Gris Nez, and commemorated on the Tower Hill Memorial London.

The second was Lance Corporal Roy Suzuki, of the 3rd/4th County of London Yeomanry (Sharpshooters) Royal Armoured Corps, (3rd/4th CLY) buried in Bannerville-la-Campagne War Cemetery, sited close to a road that a lorry driver might use en route for the ferry at Ouistreham. Roy was the son of Jukichi and Mable Ruth Suzuki of Islington London. He died, aged 23 on 18th August 1944. Checking the cemetery records, Roy Suzuki, is one of ten members of 3rd/4th CLY who all died on that day buried in row B of Plot IV in the cemetery along with a Rifleman from 2nd Bn KRRC. The ten include two lieutenants and a sergeant. It seems quite likely that LCpl Suziki buried in grave B17 was killed in the same actions as LCpl Cornish in B16, Trooper Bishop in B18, and 2Lt Pritchard B15, possibly even the same tank.

The 3rd/4th CLY had only been formed a month earlier, on 20th July 1944 from the merger of the 3rd and 4th CLY, a reflection of the heavy casualties of suffered in the Normandy campaign. The 4th CLY had take particularly heavy casualties in June when it was on the receiving end of an attack by Tiger tanks led by Michael Wittman at Villers Bocage.

: C Sqn 3 CLY Firefly tank Normandy 1944

WHAT HAPPENED TO THE 3RD/4TH CLY ON 18TH AUGUST 1944?

18th August is close to the climax of the battle of Falaise Gap. At this time, the 3rd/4th CLY were part of the 4th Armoured Brigade, commanded by the 28 old Brigadier Michael Carver. 4th Armoured Brigade were attached to 53rd Infantry Division, part of XII Corps. XII Corps had been ordered to advance South from Falaise, protecting the right flank of the IInd Canadian Corps which was attacking South to close the Falaise pocket. (1) Michael Carver had persuaded the GOC 53 Division, who wanted to advance with a series of staged infantry brigade advances that at this stage of the battle it would be better for the armour to lead. (2) 4th Armoured Brigade would lead, supported by 71st Infantry Brigade, with their objective to press on down the Falaise- Argentan road to cut off the 19 German divisions in the Falaise pocket. Despite the Brigadier’s enthusiasm for armour to take the lead, the ground was described by one of the officers from 2nd KRRC as “damnably thick and close and anything but suitable for tanks. The German infantry are well armed with bazookas and enjoy knocking out tanks from ten yards range from thick hedgerows, orchards, lanes etc.”

: Falaise Gap 16-21 Aug 1944 (Atkinson)

Between the 15th and 17th the Brigade advanced about five miles and by the 17th had captured the high ground South of Falaise. On the 18th the Sharpshooters took over as the leading Regiment in the Brigade.

: Fal

The excellent Sharpshooters website (3) gives the following extracts from the War Diary of the 3rd/4th County of London Yeomanry (Sharpshooters) August 1944

18/8/1944 B Sqn led the advance and found enemy infantry mining the road – these were quickly dispersed. The leading troop was then fired on by A/Tk guns but no hits scored, and another troop was sent round to the East but was also held up by A/Tk guns. The country was too close for deployment so smoke was put down and the leading tanks moved forward and fired HE. This was successful – one gun knocked out and one abandoned – and the advance continued. A Mark IV special was seen and knocked out but shortly afterwards the two leading tanks were hit by A/Tk fire. The driver of one tank succeeded in driving his badly damaged tank back out of range and was able to rescue his wounded crew. Arty fire was brought down on the suspected gun positions and another attempt was made to go forward but the leading tank was immediately hit. Many attempts were made to find a way round and A Coy 2/60 KRR was sent into the village ahead to try and locate the A/Tk guns and clear the area of the enemy. At 1800 A Sqn succeeded in finding a way round and took up position South of the village of ROUFIGNY. B Sqn were then able to go forward and sent a troop into the village to assist 2/60th whilst the remainder of the Regiment were together further North. During the day C Sqn had taken up a commanding position on high ground and accounted for several enemy vehicles attempting to escape.

During the
Casualties:-
2 officers killed and 8 ORs killed.
4 ORs missing.7 ORs wounded.

And on the following day

19/8/44 C Sqn took the lead and continued to advance to the high ground South of ROUFIGNY and overlooking the escape road. A/Tk fire was soon encountered and 2 tanks knocked out. The fire came from the area of FRENAY LE BUFFARD 160624 and this was subjected to arty concentrations and was heavily smoked whilst the advance continued. In the afternoon the Regiment was withdrawn before the final objective was reached. Considerable quantities of enemy transport etc. were accounted for both by the tanks and B Bty 4th RHA and a number of guns were destroyed in the village of ROUFIGNY by the 2/60th KRR.
Claims for 18th & 19th Aug:-

2 Mark IV special tanks
1 Beetle Tank
2 Mark IV SP
5 75mm A/Tk guns
1 Mark III SP
1 50mm A/Tk gun
1 Tank (unidentified)
2 Half tracked vehs
1 88mm A/Tk gun
2 A/Tk guns (unidentified)
1 French SP
Sundry lorries and cars
Casualties:- 1 OR wounded.

: 1:50,000 map showing movement of B Sqn 3rd/4th CLY 18th Aug 1944; Viewpoint 1 (Google Streetview)

The ten men in row B of plot IV in Banneville-la-Campagne were killed in the frontal attack on Roufigny. This village was in a hollow down the escarpment, quite a tough task for an armoured unit. B Squadron, seem to have been unlucky on the 18th, losing ten dead and ten wounded from the five tanks knocked out, while C Sqn suffered one wounded from the two tanks knocked out on the 19th.. The mortality rate of casualties was around 25% for the campaign as a whole, so ten dead from 20 casualties may reflect some catastrophic events such as two tanks brewing and incinerating their crew – a horrific prospect.

This operation was a success for 4th Armoured Brigade. Besides the CLY claims listed in the war diaries, the brigade captured 3,000 prisoners.

3rd/4th CLY tank with German Prisoners August 1944

The War Diary of 4th Armoured Brigade’s gunners, 4 RHA is evidence of the artillery fire-power inflicted on the Germans. (4)

“Aug 18 The 2IC went at once to Bde and got the form that the Bde was to push down the road running SSE frm Falaise to join in a general beat up of enemy tpt retreating east. Canadians, Poles, French and Americans were also to take part. The Regiment came into action about two miles south of Falaise and immediately had some wonderful shooting. OP s were continually calling for regimental and higher targets. We also had an Air OP up who had very good observation indeed, and there was so much to shoot at that it was difficult for him to choose one target from another. The 2IC, who was at Tac 4 Armd Bde, also had two reps (one from a fd regiment and one from a medium regiment sitting with him and he managed to wear out two medium guns. At one time there were three shoots going over the regimental frequency at the same time.
Aug 19 Another good day with plenty of observed and predicted shooting
Regt fired 800 rpg during these two days.”

The role that the British Army played in the Falaise Pocket is often ignored as the battle tends to focus on the impact of the air forces and they the controversy about whether the British did enough to prevent more Germans escaping. Roy Suzuki and his comrades in row B Plot IV are a testimony to the keenness of Carver to push on, the willingness and competence of the Germans to defend the flanks of the pocket and the difficulties of removing determined well armed men in good defensive terrain. They are also a reminder that arrows on tactical maps translate into handfuls of weary men faced with moving forwards towards a series of ambushes.

I’d like to know more about Roy Suzuki. I don’t know when he joined the army and whether there were any obstacles placed on the children of Japanese as there were the Germans and Italians. Maybe he joined up before Pearl Harbour. When I mentioned the Japanese British to Gordon Corrigan yesterday at the Battlefields Trust lunchtime lecture yesterday he told me that he know of at least one other. This man served in the Dorset Regiment he was the son of a Japanese musician who was travelling and working in Britain at the outbreak of war. He joined up when everyone else did. How many other Japanese or Anglo Japanese served in the British forces in the Second World War?

References

1. 12 Corps G War Diary August 1944 Appendix B HS/WD/NWE/159/1/H quoted in: Cabinet Papers: Liberation Campaign In North West Europe Phase 4 The Break Out And The Advance To The Crossing Of The Seine 16 June -29 August 1944
2. Patrick Delaforce: Monty’s Marauders
3. http://www.sharpshooters.org.uk/news/item.aspx?id=27
4. 4 RHA War Diary August 1944
5. http://www.mapmanusa.com/images/book-maps/rick-atkinson-guns-at-last-light-falaise-pocket.jpg

More about battlefield tours to Normandy here

British Battlefields, Military History

The Battlefields Trust at History Live: Kelmarsh 2013

22 July 2013 admin Leave a comment

The Observation Post dropped into Kelmarsh on Saturday 20th July. The Battlefields Trust were there in force. Their stand in the main exhibition tent was well staffed and very busy throughout the day. Well done to all the team who were busy signing up new members of the Trust.

2013-07-20 11.05_LR — Development Officer Julian Humphries and the Trust’ Shop: Books and toys for boys and girls of all ages!

Mike Ingram's Interpretation of the Battle of Bosworth. — Mike Ingram’s Interpretation of the Battle of Bosworth, based on the findings from the Battlefield Trust’s Archaeological project 2006-2010.

Alan and Nichola Turton (Wessex Region) with some of their collection of civil war and other archaeological finds. — Alan and Nicola Turton (Wessex Region) with some of their collection of civil war and other archaeological finds.

More about the Battlefields Trust here link

19th Century, British Battlefields, Military History, Napoleonic Wars

Where has Napoleon’s Observatory at Waterloo Gone?

27 June 2013 admin 3 Comments

Print on sale in various US Fine Art Suppliers attributed to Kelly 1815

Extract from sketch map made on the field of Waterloo 1815 (National Army Museum)

I spent yesterday in the National Army Museum looking for material which would be of interest to the City Lit Summer school I am tutoring on the Battle of Waterloo. The collection is fascinating. It is one thing to read the accounts in books. Its another to hold in your hands the letters and diaries of the soldiers of the time; or to see the some of the paintings in their reserve collection, and the preliminary sketches of the battlefield by the artists.

One intriguing object is a water colour sketch map, with the inscription “used on the battlefield”. The archive staff had no information about the provenance of the item, which had once been framed. The sketch map shows some of the key terrain features visible from the Anglo-Dutch position, including the village of Mont St Jean, the farm of the same name, the villages where the Anglo Dutch Army deployed, Hougoumont, Mon Plaisir and La Haye Sainte and the ridge lines in the French positions. Intriguingly, the map did not have some of the terrain features that appear on battle maps to explain the course of the battle. So the village of Placenoit is not marked. Nor is the track running across the front of the Anglo Dutch position, the famous sunken road. So maybe this map was one produced by Wellington’s staff on the day for orientation purposes. ( “The farm in the dip a couple of hundred paces in front of us is called La Haye Saint and the chateau on our right about a mile away on the right hand side of the walled garden is Hougoumont”) One distinctive feature shown is an observation tower south of Hougoumont and East of the Mont Plaisir Farm. Its an obvious feature, and one that also appears in some of the pen and ink sketches made by the painter Richard Dighton of the battlefield after the battle.

Location of Observatory on Craan's map of Waterloo 1816 — Location of Observatory on Craan’s map of Waterloo 1816

This tower also appears on the map drawn up by the Dutch Surveyor Willem Benjamin Craan in 1816 as the “Observatory” (1) and in Wagner’s maps (2) it’s function is labelled as “telegraph”, which may explain its function as part of an optical telegraph system. The tower is also described as 35 feet tall.

This tower ought to be tactically

Extract from Wagner’s Map

significant. One of the ingredients of Wellington’s success was his use of a reverse slope to hide his deployment from the French. But a man standing on the observation tower above the 135m contour would be at an elevation of around 150m, 15m higher than the crest of the Mont St Jean Ridge. This should have enabled Napoleon and Ney to have seen some way down the reverse slope. Obviously once the battle started the visibility would have been obscured by smoke, but before the battle started Napoleon could have had a much better idea of Wellington’s deployment at the start of the battle than many historians would have us believe.

Besides the sketch map in the National Army Museum, there are several documented mentions of the observatory in a manuscript held by the British Library and in the documents published by Booth as a semi official record.(3) The testimony of Jean Baptise De Coster, a local guide for Napoleon mentioned how he did not see Napoleon make any use of the observatory. A foot note to this account mentions that Napoleon had spent an hour up the tower and that it had been constructed by Dutch engineers six weeks before the battle. A British Visitor to the Battlefield of Waterloo on the 16th July 1815 describes, how after dining at the farm of La Belle Alliance, he “Went to the Observatory, it is thirty -six feet high; I nailed on the pinnacle the Royal Arms of Great Britain” (Booth: Additional Particulars: P 121) I recall seeing this tower depicted in a print distributed in the old Battle of Waterloo Jackdaw. It seemed a very fanciful depiction of the battle with an Observation Tower and the trail of rockets like V2s streaking overhead. The tower doesn’t seem to appear in many of the more modern depictions of the battle. It isn’t mentioned in Andrew Uffendall’s “On the fields of Glory” (4) Nor In Atkins’ otherwise excellent Waterloo Companion,(5) although his panorama from the Lion mound does appear to show a mobile phone mast in roughly the same direction, there is no tower on that site now.

Napoleon's observation post at Ligny — Napoleon on the observation post erected by sappers at the Bussey Mill

There are several un-answered questions about the tower.

Who built it? Was it built by Napoleon’s Sappers? Napoleon did order sappers to build an observation platform for him at Ligny, but pictures show the observation post at Ligny as scaffolding around a windmill. Or was it by the Dutch, as in the footnote to the memoirs published by Booth in 1817?

Is there any evidence that Napoleon made use of the tower, except for the foot note in Booth contradicting De Coster?

What could a French Observer have seen of the Anglo Dutch positions from the Tower?

Why hasn’t this Tower been mentioned in any recent military histories of Waterloo? It made enough of an impact on the British for the Tower to feature in the accounts.

(The origins of this post are in the Waterloo Campaign City Lit Summer School. The class visit to the National Army Museum revealed the sketch map drawn on the battlefield possibly for use during the battle.)

References:

Craan, W. B. Plan of the battle of Waterloo or Mount St. John [cartographic material] : reduced from the large plan of the same battle, made up and published in 1816
August Wagner’s Plane der Schlachten und Treffen welche von der preussischen Armee in den Feldzügen der Jahre 1813, 14 und 15 geliefert worden, 4 volumes (Berlin: G. Reimer, 1825.)
John Booth, The Battle of Waterloo also of Ligny, and Quatre-Bras, described by the series of accounts Published by Authority, with Circumstantial details. By a near Observer. Printed for John Booth 1817 together with “Additional Particulars of the Battle of Waterloo etc” available to download here
Andrew Uffindell and Michael Corum. On the Fields of Glory: The Battlefields of the 1815 Campaign Greenhill Books, 1991
Mark Adkin, The Waterloo Companion; Stakpole 2001

Gunners, Medieval, Military History, Normandy

Will archaeology confirm Crécy (1346) as the first honour title of The Royal Artillery?

29 May 2013 admin Leave a comment

Battle of Crecy an Illustration from Froissanrt's chronicles — Battle of Crecy an Illustration from Froissanrt’s chronicles (wikipedia Commons)

The battle of Crécy (1346), alongside Agincourt (1415) has gone down in history as the triumph of the English foot soldier armed with the longbow over the French Knights. It has been known for a long time that Edward III had four cannons with his army, but their role on the battlefield has been dismissed, as having no effect beyond announcing that fire-power had arrived on the battlefield. However, in a speech to the Battlefields Trust, Professor Michael Prestwich argued that we should re-examine our interpretation of the Battle of Crécy and that Edward III’s cannons had a much bigger impact than as a mere gimmick of alchemy.

Edward III’s unexpected victory over the French at Crécy-en-Pontieu near Abbeville overturned the presumption that knights would ride down foot soldiers. This established the Longbow as an important weapon, the yeoman archers of England as heroes, and demonstrated the fighting power behind Edward III’s claim to the French throne which started the Hundred Years War.

King Edward III landed in Normandy in July. Having captured Caen he moved East to cross the Seine and then headed North along the coast, pursued by a larger French Army under King Philip VI of France. Edward crossed the Somme after winning the Battle of Blanchetaque on August 24. Tired from their marching and fighting the English army encamped near the Forest of Crécy. Philip raced towards Crécy with his men, keen to defeat the English and angry that he had failed to trap them between the Seine and Somme.

It is generally accepted that Edward deployed his men along a ridge between the villages of Crécy and Wadicourt and divided his army into three divisions. The right division was assigned to his sixteen-year old son Edward, the Black Prince. The left division was led by the Earl of Northampton, while Edward, commanding from a vantage point in a windmill, commanded the reserve. These divisions were comprised of dismounted men at arms supported by large numbers of archers equipped with the English longbow. The English improved their position by digging ditches and laying obstacles in front of their position. The baggage train was in the rear of the English position. Sometimes accounts mention that four cannons were positioned in the front line.

The leading parts of Philip’s army, advancing North from Abbeville arrived near the English around mid-day on August 26. The French started the battle before the whole French army had arrived on the battlefield. The French advance was led by several thousand mercenary Genoese crossbowmen, followed by thousands of French knights organised into divisions under the leading nobles, while King Philip commanded the rearguard.

When the Genoese crossbowmen approached close enough they fired a series of volleys at the English. These proved ineffective compared to the English response which was devastated the Genoese and forced them to retreat. This in turn provoked some French Knights to cut down the retreating Genoese as for their cowardice. The failure of the Genoese is attributed to several factors. A brief thunderstorm before the battle had wet their bowstrings. The decision to start the battle early, meant that they fought without their pavise’s wooden shields behind which they could shelter while reloading. Also, the rate of fire of a longbow was far in excess of a crossbow, with a longbow-man loosing thre or four arrows to each crosw-bow bolt.

The French knights fell into confusion as they collided with the retreating Genoese. Continuing the attack, the French knights were forced to negotiate the slope of the ridge and the man-made obstacles. Cut down in large numbers by the archers, the felled knights and their horses blocked the advance of those to the rear.

At some point in the battle Edward received a message from his son requesting assistance. This King Edward refused, stating “I am confident he will repel the enemy without my help,” and “Let the boy win his spurs.” As evening approached the English still held their position after repelling sixteen French charges, and felling their attackers with arrows. This was a huge English victory.

But, this interpretation is based on conflicting and fragmentary sources surviving from medieval records. Michael Prestwich pointed out the accepted interpretation is largely based on a selective choice about which sources to accept and which to reject. Even the location is uncertain. Geoffrey le Baker, refers to the field of Crecy, while Froissart writes that battle took place near a wood, somewhere between Crécy and La Broie, (five miles apart) and the king was on the mound of a windmill, at the rear of his army. While another source, Henry Knighton mentions another place name, Westglyse, identified as Watteglise, which is to the north-east.

Michael Prestwich also drew attention to Italian sources which give a very different version of the battle from the English and French, and for work done by Richard Barber in an as yet unpublished work on Crécy. These accounts are dismissed as being written at third hand and in a third country. But there were large number of Italian Genoese present at the start of the engagement. One of these accounts, by Giovanni Villani, who died in 1348, “stressed above all the English encampment of carts. The whole army, he said, in three battalions, was enclosed in a ring of carts, with a single entrance. Bombards were placed under the carts, and the archers shot from them, their arrows stacked in barrels.” The same account also includes a description of the effectiveness of the artillery “The English guns cast iron balls by means of fire…They made a noise like thunder and caused much loss in men and horses…The Genoese were continually hit by the archers and the gunners…[by the end of the battle] the whole plain was covered by men struck down by arrows and cannon balls.”

Professor Prestwich also quoted a second Italian account which dates from about 1360, and thanked Richard Barber for this. According to this account “Edward surrounded his army with iron chains, fixed to posts, in a horseshoe plan. Carts were then placed outside the chains, tipped up with their shafts in the air. Ditches were dug to reinforce the defences. Archers were hidden in the woods and cornfields – the author noted that as it was very cold in northern France, corn was not harvested until September, and in Crécy it was still standing (the battle was 26 August). The Genoese had to climb a slope to approach the English position. They could not shoot their crossbows and were mostly cut down. The English archers, advancing through the corn, shot at the French cavalry and did so much damage that the battle was lost. There is a telling detail in this account. The Genoese crossbowmen’s problem was not that their bowstrings were damp – this account explains that the difficulty was that the ground was so muddy and soft that they found it impossible to put the crossbows down and hold them there with the stirrup for reloading. “

Leonard da Vinci´s organ gun (wikipedia Commons)

These Italian accounts are usually discredited because it is hard to reconcile the accounts of the carts with known practices of the time.

But perhaps the Genoese were describing something they had not seen before and could not understand. What they may have been looking at is the vehicles needed to support a gun battery – the worlds first wagon lines. Guns need a lot of vehicles, to transport the pieces, protect the ready use ammunition from the elements, carry ammunition and all the services to support the men who serve the guns. Edwards battery may have needed the ability to cast or carve their own shot, carry and possibly manufacture gunpowder. Edward’s army was on the move. It had prepared to fight at Crecy and it may have made sense to retain the ammunition and stores needed for the guns close by rather than banishing them to the baggage train.

As artillery evolved all the vehicles were held in the wagon lines where they would be protected from enemy fire. But at Crecy there was no enemy artillery fire, and contrary to Hollywood, flaming arrows were not a normal medieval battlefield weapon. A separate wagon lines would be additional risks to an English army marching through hostile territory and faced with a superior mounted enemy. And the wagons and carts might also have provided cover for archers.

English Organ Gun C15th illustration (wilkipedia Commons)

Edward’s army may have been accompanied by more than the four bombards. According to Michael Prestwich, Edward had ordered 100 small guns, known as ribalds, in October 1345. These had, it seems, wheeled carriages, and were probably multi-barrelled.

So maybe the battle of Crecy was the worlds first battle where artillery played a significant part in the battle. So far this is a bit of speculation based on an after dinner speech by an eminent historian and information sources hiding in plain sight on the Internet. But the early gunpowder era is interesting for lots of reasons, not least because modern archaeological techniques have been able to establish new facts about medieval battlefields from the evidence that gunpowder weapons leave. In the last couple of years Glenn Foard rediscovered the battlefield of Bosworth from the cannon balls. Perhaps it is time to start a project to search for cannon balls from Crecy that may have sunk in the wet soil.

19th Century, Military History

Battles of the 19th Century – CityLit Summer School Course Programme

19 May 2013 admin 1 Comment

CityLit, the London based centre for Adult Learning is offering a series of summer school one day courses on the battles of the Nineteenth Century. The story of 19th century battles is is a story of technology and tactics, culture and Clausewitz. For two hundred years from 1600 warfare was a matter of cannon, horse and musket, with either bayonet or pike. The industrial revolution brought rapid changes in technology, with dramatic changes affecting almost every aspect of warfare. Weapons became more accurate, with longer ranges and more lethal effects. The steam age revolutionised transport and logistics. The changes in communication and culture affected how wars were fought and perceived by the public. This inquisitive era saw an explosion in the study of warfare and of military history, by figures such as Clausewitz, Jomeni and du Picq,

The soldiers of this era probably experienced more change than at any time in history before or probably since. Some of the men who fought in the Waterloo campaign took part in the campaigns of 1793-4 alongside and against men who had served in the wars of Frederick the Great. Some of the men who fought in the Victorian Imperial small wars in South Africa and Afghanistan lived to contemplate the Great War in 1914-18, with its trenches, aeroplanes and tanks. Lt Smith-Dorrien, survived the Assegais of the Zulus at Isandlwana to command an Army Corps in the BEF in 1914-5 against the machine guns and poison gas of the Kaiser’s army. Lord Roberts of Kandahar, the British hero of the 1879-80 Afghan war, had been commissioned under the Duke of Wellington, was awarded the Victoria Cross in the Indian mutiny and died in the field in Flanders in 1914.

The series of one day courses covers a range of battles from Waterloo in 1815 to Maiwand in 1880, including Waterloo, Gettysburg, Sadowa/Königgrätz, Sedan, Isandlwana and Maiwand. The courses last between two hours and six hours each at a modest cost. £11-21 full Senior £6-12 and Concession £3-7. I am the tutor for all apart from Sedan.

10th Hussars at the Batle of Waterloo Denis Dighton (wikipedia commons)

The Waterloo Campaign in mid June 1815 is the climax of the Napoleonic wars. Its a coda to Napoleon Bonaparte’s career. Its also the only occasion when Napoleon faced Wellington and has given rise to bridges, railway stations roads and Eurovision winning songs. This day will include a visit to the National Army Museum and draw on some of their unique resources, including the famous model by Captain Siborne. More details here

Pickett's Charge. at Gettysburg, taken from "Hancock at Gettysbug" by Thure de Thulstrup, Restoration by Adam Cuerden. (wikipedia commons) — Pickett’s Charge. at Gettysburg, taken from “Hancock at Gettysbug” by Thure de Thulstrup, Restoration by Adam Cuerden. (wikipedia commons)

This July is the 150th anniversary of the battle of Gettysburg, 1-3 July 1863. This is the iconic battle of the US Civil war. Not only was it the largest battle in the war and indeed, the Western hemisphere, and a turning point in the war. Abraham Lincoln’s address at a remembrance ceremony on the battlefield in 1863, is one of the greatest political speeches of all time. More details here

Cavalry battle between Imperial and Royal Hussars and Prussians Cuirassiers at the battle of Königgrätz (Alexander von Bensa, 1866).

The Seven Weeks war of 1866 culminated in the battle of Sadowa, also known by Germans as Königgrätz, 3rd July 1866. This was one of the defining battles of the era, establishing the success of the Prussian military machine and the dominance of Prussia over Austria as the leading German state. It was the first campaign won by the genius of Von Moltke and the first battle fought with infantry armed with bolt action breech loading rifles. More details here

Napoleon III Surrenders his Sword after the Battle of Sedan (wikipedia Commons)

The battle of Sedan in 1870 marked the defeat of Napoleon III and the end of his Empire, and a decisive moment in the Franco-Prussian War. This war was the first in which both protagonists had breech loading bolt action rifles, rifled artillery and saw the first use of the machine gun on a European Battlefield. More details here

Battle if Isandlwana 1879 by Charles Edwin Fripp (wikipedia Commons)

Isandlwana 22 January 1879 and Maiwand 27 July 1880 were two setbacks suffered by the British Empire in the last quarter of the the Nnineteenth century. Isandlwana, was the first battle of the Anglo-Zulu war and resulted in one of the biggest defeats for the British army for a generation. Maiwand was a dramatic episode in the Second Afghan War, a controversial part of Disraeli’s foreign policy. Both of these battles captured the public imagination and have been the subjects of art, literature and film. During this day we will visit the National Army Museum and look at some of their collections and archives relating to these battles. More details here

"Maiwand: Saving the Guns" by Richard Caton Woodville.(wikipedia commons) — “Maiwand: Saving the Guns” by Richard Caton Woodville.(wikipedia).

Details of how to visit these battlefields – to follow.

However, visitors specifically interested in the battlefield of Maiwand and other sites of the Second Afghan War are advised to contact their nearest Army Careers Office for details of their expeditionary packed tours which offer good value but rather inflexible terms and conditions.

Military History, The Great War, Uncategorized

Travel to Overseas Battlefields can now be part of First World War Centenary Projects

17 May 2013 admin Leave a comment

The Heritage Lottery Fund (HLF) scheme for small community projects for the First World War Centenary announced on 16th May 2013 can be used to support travel to battlefields and memorials outside the UK.

This was not highlighted in the launch announcement nor in the newspaper reports. However, it is clear from the Heritage Lottery Fund’s own website that projects which meet certain criteria will be eligible for for HLF funding. The HLF recognises the value of travel to battlefields and memorials in deepening people’s understanding of the war and its impacts. However, any visit must be linked to activities in the UK, must enhance peoples experience and learning, while not being the main focus of a project. HLF also expects a bidder to demonstrate that the cost of the activity abroad is as reasonable as possible, that there is a genuine need for the funding, and that travel will deliver outcomes in proportion to the funding requested.

Here are the relevant paragraphs from the HLF Q&A page . (Note this page has been replaced and briefing information is now here )

Can our application include costs for travel and activity outside the UK?

Yes, if your project is based in the UK.

We will fund the cost of travel and activity outside the UK (including the cost of bringing people to the UK) if there is a clear rationale for it in the project, it contributes to outcomes for heritage, people and communities in the UK and offers value for money.

What costs can you cover outside the UK?

We can consider any costs that are associated with your project activities – this could include for example, travel, accommodation, insurance, or activities in museums or heritage sites involving people from the UK.

We ask that you explore how you can make the cost of your activity abroad as reasonable as possible. For example, you could send a small group of people to explore the heritage on a research trip who could then come and feed back to the rest of the group, or you could pay to bring people to the UK to share their expertise and insights. In order to fund travel and activities abroad, you will need to demonstrate that there is a genuine need for the funding, and that the additional outcomes achieved are in proportion to the funding requested. Some questions we might ask are:

To what extent does the travel outside the UK enhance people’s understanding and learning, or broaden their perspectives of the war?
Could this level of understanding be achieved in a lower-cost way?
Will the travel and activity abroad enhance the long-term outcomes of the project? For example, will it result in long-term relationships which will result in new understandings of the war and its impacts?
Are you contributing any partnership funding?

Can we get a grant to take a group to visit the former battlefields and cemeteries in Europe?

We recognise the value of visiting a site, and that this can deepen people’s understanding of the war and its impacts. You should show that a visit is linked to activities in the UK, and that it will enhance people’s experience and learning. The visit should not be the main focus of a project.

If the main activity and cost in your project is visit abroad, then the project is unlikely to offer good value for money.

Can HLF provide funding for projects outside the UK?

No. Money raised through the National Lottery can only be invested in projects based in the UK.

This is very welcome news and should enable communities to draw on the battlefields themselves as a resource for the centenary commemorations. The Observation Post has been making the case for this funding ever since the Great War Commemorations were first discussed in 2011 and established the Men Behind the Memorial project to draw attention to the potential of the battlefields to develop our understanding of the War and its context.

Baldwin Battlefield Tours is developing a Centenary Advisory Service to support Community Groups with military historians and other resources to enable them to make the most of the Battlefields as part of their First World War Centenary Projects.

Military History

City Lit “Introduction to Battlefield Guiding” Summer School Course 6th &13th July 2013

7 May 2013 admin 1 Comment

The London based adult education organisation CityLit are running 1 two day “Introduction to Battlefield Guiding” course as part of the 2013 Summer School. The course tutor is Frank Baldwin, owner of the weblog www.theobservationpost.com who put forward the course. It is aimed at anyone who is interested in becoming a battlefield guide.

Battlefield Guiding Local History: Battlefield Walk at the Battle of Barnet (1471)

What sort of people are interested in becoming battlefield guides? Historically battlefield guides have either been veterans, historians or a sub set of professional tour guides who specialised in military destinations. But this is no longer true. There are lots of people inspired by military historians such as Richard Holmes and Dan Snow. Since the 1980s military history has become a popular subject in Britain both with the public and as an academic subject. A lot of people are interested in military history. (About 35% of men and 10% of women if research commissioned in 2006 is to be believed)

Tourism is one of Britains’ largest export industries. We are good at this more and more travel is geared towards heritage and cultural tourism. In a life time of work which we now expect to extend to the full three score and ten this is an activity that allows someone to make money from a hobby. For most guides it is something that can be more than a hobby but less than a career. It fits well with a portfolio career.

We are also likely to need more guides too. There is a lot of potential interest generated by interest in the Great War, in particular from people and groups who will be seeking to know more about what happened to particular soldiers www.menbehindmemorials.com rather than a tour of the edited highlights of the Western Front. Britain’s own battlefield and military heritage is under developed. There hundreds of sites of battles, sieges , skirmishes and military installations with fascinating stories behind them , just waiting for a good story teller to bring them to life.

Battlefield Guiding for Remembrance: Royal British Legion Pilgrimage, Mohne Dam 2008 (Photo: Keith Wiseman)

Heritage tourism is a serious industry and battlefield guides are expected to provide a professional service. Customers expect high standards from all aspects of the service they receive in an industry which is regulated to protect the public. Anyone delivering a service to the public has legal obligations, which could be painful in our litigious world. Anyone seeking to employ a guide needs to know that the guide knows their subject matter, can present information well and knows how to look after the customer, and by implication the interests of an employing tour operator.

Someone wishing to be a professional tour guide in the UK is advised to become a Blue Badge guide via the scheme managed by the Institute of Tour Guiding. This involves two years of study of the culture and heritage of particular regions through organised instruction, followed by examinations which qualify the guide to be listed as a Registered Guide, and costs around £5,000 in tuition and examination fees. While this is excellent preparation for taking visitors around the sights of Britain, it is less useful if the purpose of becoming a guide is to lead tours to the battlefields of the World Wars. It is also overkill for someone who just wants to be able to lead visitors to a local battlefield on behalf of the Battlefields Trust or a local battlefield society.

Battlefield guiding as part of vocational training. British Soldiers discussing the lessons of the Siege of Lichfield (1643). (Image copyright Frank Baldwin)

Ten years ago, in 2003, a group of battlefield guides, under the patronage of Richard Holmes and John Hughes Wilson, set up The Guild of Battlefields Guides (GBG). The aims of the Guild are to analyse, develop and raise the understanding and practice of battlefield guiding, provide an environment to meet fellow guides and share information, expertise and knowledge. Guild members seeking to demonstrate their competence as a guide undertake series of practical and written assignments that form a validation system developed by a team headed by educationalist and military historian Dr Chris Scott. Guides who pass the standard set are awarded a badge that shows that they have demonstrated their competences in military knowledge, presentation skills and customer care to their peers.

The GBG members have chosen not to seek accreditation for the GBG Validation programme by an academic body, in order to minimise the costs to members. The Guild does not provide training in the Guiding competences. It was established to validate the standard of working guides. Guides will be expected to undertake self study or develop their skills and knowledge through their work either as battlefield guides or through related skills derived from military service or academic research.

For people seeking to become a battlefield guide this presents a Catch 22 problem. How is a guide expected to gain experience? – Through work. How does a guide obtain work – though demonstrating their experience. Many prospective guides will already have a lot of the relevant knowledge and competences. However, even with good knowledge of military history, good communication skills and customer services experience, it helps to understand the terminology and the nuances of the trade.

Battlefield Guiding to support learning outside the classroom: School tour to France. (Photo Frank Baldwin)

The City Lit Course is intended as an introduction to becoming a battlefield guide. It takes far longer than two days to learn the professional knowledge or develop the practical skills expected of a competent guide. It will give prospective guides an idea of the standards expected and an opportunity to assess their own training needs and prepare a plan to aquire the skills they need, through personal study or by undertaking some further training.

The course does not form part of the Guild of Battlefield Guides Professional Development Programme. Please direct any questions about the course to CityLit via the details on the course programme here

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